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RESPONSES
RECONSTRUCTIVE TASKS FOR A LIBERAL FEMINIST
CONCEPTION OF PRIVACY
LINDA C. McCLAIN*
INTRODUCTION

If liberal conceptions of privacy survive appropriately vigorous
feminist critique and re-emerge in beneficially reconstructed
forms, then why haven't more feminists gotten the message and
embraced, rather than spurned, such privacy? If liberal privacy
survives feminist critique, does it face an even more serious
threat if contemporary society has both diminishing expectations
of and taste for privacy? Does the transformation of the very notion of "private life," due in part to the rise of such new technologies as the Internet and its seemingly endless possibilities for
making oneself accessible to others and gaining access to others,
suggest the need for liberal and feminist defenders of privacy to
rethink the value of privacy and whether it is, indeed, indispensable for citizenship and a good life? Finally, if privacy is indispensable, is it consistent with liberal principles to force people
not to surrender their privacy, even if they wish to, just as liberal governments force people not to surrender their freedom?
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. This Essay is a revised
version of a paper presented at the conference "Reconstructing Liberalism," sponsored
by The Institute of Bill of Rights Law and the William and Mary Department of
Philosophy, held at The College of William & Mary School of Law, April 3-4, 1998. I
am indebted to conference participants for helpful comments, and especially to
Cynthia Ward, Kathryn Abrams, Katherine Franke, and my co-panelists Anita Allen
and Neal Devins. Jim Fleming gave valuable comments on several drafts. I also benefitted from helpful discussion with my colleagues Eric Freedman and Norm Silber.
Thanks to Suzanne Mikos, Bram Weber, and law librarian Connie Lenz for valuable
research assistance, and to Hofstra University School of Law for generous research
support.
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These are important and intriguing questions raised by Professor Anita Allen's elegant essay, Coercing Privacy,' to which it
is a pleasure to respond. In this Essay, I state my substantial
agreement with Allen's proposition that "[fleminist critiques of
privacy leave the liberal conceptions of privacy" (or the idea that
government should respect and protect a degree of inaccessibility
to persons and personal information) and "private choice" (or the
idea that government ought to promote decisional privacy concerning important decisions with regard to friendship, sex, marriage, reproduction, religion, and political association) "very
much alive," and that various forms of privacy and private
choice, appropriately reconstructed, are beneficial to women and
are helping women gain greater control over their lives. 2 Elsewhere, I have defended privacy against feminist and civic republican attacks, as an important principle and value, and I have
maintained that liberal feminism is a tenable and attractive
position.3
In Section One, I ponder why the critique of privacy continues
to be a staple of feminist legal scholarship, notwithstanding the
valuable work done by Allen and other liberal feminists to engage constructively with such feminist critiques and point to the
possibility of an egalitarian, liberal feminist conception of privacy.
I conclude that, to strengthen the case for such a conception of
privacy, liberalism and liberal feminism should carry forward
three roconstructive projects, each of which follows from Allen's
defense of privacy. These three reconstructive tasks are enriching liberalism's normative account of the value of privacy, defending some form of a public/private distinction, and arguing

1. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 723 (1999).
2. Id. at 750.
3. For arguments supporting the viability of a liberal feminist jurisprudential
approach, see Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection,
and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171 (1992); Linda C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond "Empty" Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19 (1998) [hereinafter McClain,
Toleration]. For defenses of privacy against civic republican and feminist critiques,
see James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76
TEX. L. REv. 509 (1997); Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle,
The Sanctuary, and The Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195 (1995) [hereinafter
McClain, Inviolability]; Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 119 (1992) [hereinafter McClain, Privacy].
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for governmental responsibility to engage in a formative project
to secure the preconditions for enjoying privacy and exercising
"private choice" (or what I will also call autonomy or decisional
privacy). I sketch the contours of these three projects, considering the resources available for their realization (including the
legacy of the Reconstruction Amendments4 ).
I agree with Allen that reconstructed liberal privacy survives
feminist critique.5 I am less persuaded, however, by her suggestion that it may not survive society's reduced "expectations" of
and "tastes" for privacy6 and that, accordingly, government may
need to shore up this erosion and "impos[e] privacy norms to
undergird the liberal vision of moral freedom and independence."' She defends such regulation as "consistent both with8
liberalism and with the egalitarian aspirations of feminism,"
and suggests that all of us-liberals, feminists, and nonfeinists-should be worried "by the optional and challenged character taken on by personal privacy."9 Of particular interest to
Allen, as a feminist, is that some women have little taste for
privacy and engage in self-exposure or objectification, offering up
their privacy for consumption by others.1"
By raising these concerns, Allen, a scholar thoroughly steeped
in the intricate moral and legal debates over privacy, signals her
eagerness to move on to a new set of issues about privacy. Her
exploration of these new questions is valuable, potentially
ground-breaking, and convincing to a point. At the conclusion of
Section One, I raise some questions about Allen's claims that
privacy, like freedom, is indispensable and a precondition for
participation in liberal democratic society, and I suggest the
need for some further thinking about what role privacy plays in
a liberal or liberal feminist formative project.1
4. The inspiration for invoking Reconstruction comes from Peggy Davis's argument that a focus on Reconstruction and the principle of autonomy, rather than
penumbral privacy, would better justify the Supreme Court's due process liberty jurisprudence. See PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLE= STORIES: THE CONSrTTUToN AND FAMILY
VALUES 214-49 (1997).
5. See Allen, supra note 1, at 743.
6. See id. at 728, 732, 751:
7. Id. at 729.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 752.
10. See id. at 730-32, 737, 751.
11. See id. at 754-55; see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT:
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In Section Two, I offer some further responses to Allen's call
to shore up privacy. First, I concur somewhat with her diagnosis
of an erosion of tastes for and expectations of privacy. I read the
ongoing debates over the proper social and legal regulation of
information technologies, however, as evincing not the demise of
privacy, but the desire to retain such core values of privacy as
restricted access and anonymity while taking advantage of the
unprecedented possibilities for forms of community, education,
exploration, and, yes, self-exposure. In that context, I offer some
preliminary thoughts about cyberspace and gender; for example,
the potential of cyberspace to foster women's sexual agency, or
what one feminist legal theorist calls "Cybersexual Possibilities." 2 Second, I suggest that, to the extent that Allen is correct
regarding a diminished taste for privacy, this may not be entirely a bad thing, much less grounds for forcing people to be private. Sometimes, the repudiation of privacy may foster equal
citizenship and facilitate social and legal change.'" I interpret
this development as a necessary step in solving what Allen elsewhere describes as women's "privacy problem"--"the problem of
getting rid of unwanted forms of privacy" and "acquiring the
privacy and decisional privacy they do not have." 4

I. THREE RECONSTRUCTiVE TASKS FOR A LIBERAL FEMINIST
CONCEPTION OF PRIVACY

Allen economically sets out the main features of common feminist critiques of privacy: privacy connotes female seclusion and
subordination, leading to women's underparticipation in society
and vulnerability to violence in the home, and privacy emphasizes negative liberty, precluding any robust conception of affirmative governmental obligations. 5 I believe, as Allen's present
essay and her other writings addressing feminist criticisms illus-

AMERICA

IN

SEARCH

OF A

PUBLIC

PHILOsOPHY

6

(1996)

(referring

to

civic

republicanism's "formative project" of inculcating in citizens the qualities of character
and civic virtues necessary for self-government).
12. See Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming Sex from the Pornographers:Cybersexual Possi-

bilities, 83 GEO. L.J. 1969, 1974-77 (1995).
13. See infra notes 90-112, 151-88, and accompanying text.
14. ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY
180-81 (1988).
15. See Allen, supra note 1, at 741-49.
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trate, that liberal privacy, properly clarified, can meet these
charges. 6 Why, then, does privacy continue to draw such feminist criticisms? Further, why have more feminist theorists not
concurred with Allen that privacy can play an important part in
helping women gain more control over their lives? To be sure,
some feminist theorists (and here I include myself) do share Allen's assessment of the potential of privacy, if properly reconstructed.' 7 Feminist work, however, often expresses an acute
suspiciousness about and uneasiness over privacy and links it
directly to the failure of law and society to afford women equal
protection of the law and to promote their well-being.18 Indeed,
privacy continues to feature prominently in feminist work as a
barrier to these ends. 9

16. In addition to her book, Uneasy Access, supra note 14, see Anita Allen, Privacy,
in A CoM1PANION TO FEImIST PHILOSOPHY 465 (Alison M. Jaggar & Iris Marion Young
eds., 1998) [hereinafter Allen, Privacy] (acknowledging that feminist skepticism about
applications of privacy is justified, but arguing that "appropriate forms of physical,
informational, and decisional privacy" are allowing women to have greater control
over their lives); Anita L. Allen, The Jurispoliticsof Privacy, in RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL THEORY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 68, 73-75, 79 (Mary Lyndon Shanley & Uma
Narayan eds., 1997) [hereinafter Allen, The Jurispolitics of Privacy] (arguing that
privacy-based reproductive rights benefit many poor women and that a progressive
ative governmental obligation to subinterpretation of privacy may support an aff
sidize women's reproductive rights; also discussing how privacy "[tiort law has
helped to vindicate some of women's many interests in informational privacy and
confidentiality").
17. See McClain, Inviolability, supra note 3, at 207-20; McClain, Privacy, supra
note 3, at 150-72; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1462-81
(1991); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 99699 (1991).
18. See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALIsm 58-65, 118-21 (1994) (discussing the marital rape exemption and arguing that the modem liberal conception
of "ordered liberty" under the Constitution protects the sphere of liberty and privacy
in which violence against women takes place); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections
on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1311-24 (1991) (critiquing the realm
of constitutionally-protected privacy as often a "hellhole" for women instead of a refuge); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2154-74 (linking rhetoric of marital privacy to lack of protection
of women against spousal assault). For an important early feminist critique of privacy along these lines, see Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 328,
331-35 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (discussing how the state's failure to regulate
the "private," domestic sphere contributes to male dominance).
19. See generally Siegel, supra note 18 (providing a historical examination of the
use of the rhetoric of "affective" (or marital) privacy to immunize violence against
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Feminist resistance to privacy likely has several sources.
First, as Allen suggests, liberal privacy survives "appropriately"
strenuous critique: feminists correctly attack deployments of
notions of privacy that have created and perpetuated women's
unequal citizenship. ° Where liberal feminists such as Allen and
myself may differ with privacy's feminist critics is not over the
need to reject those harmful and unjust deployments of privacy
and their legacy, but over the possibility of holding on to some
core of privacy that is worthy of reconstruction or clarification.
Second, the origins and imagery of the right of privacy may fail
to capture feminists' imaginations and may instead alienate or
offend them. At best, there is the image conjured up by Warren
and Brandeis's famous article-a propertied, privileged white
male in need of shelter from the prying eyes of the press2 1 -or
the equally gendered image of the modest, secluded female, conjured up by such early privacy precedents as De May v. Roberts2 2 and Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford.23 At worst,
there is the legacy of judicial refusal to "rais[e] the curtain"
around the home and the marital bedchamber to "expos[e]
[them] to public curiosity and criticism,"24 leaving women injured within such private places largely without remedy.25 Third,
feminists associate liberal privacy with negative liberty (and the
"negative constitution"), and too readily conclude that such privacy cannot sustain a conception of affirmative governmental
responsibilities.2 6

women from legal redress and suggesting parallels with the contemporary challenges
to the Violence Against Women Act).
20. See Allen, supra note 1, at 741-42.
21. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195-97, 204-06 (1890).
22. 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881) (upholding action for invasion of privacy by presence
of stranger in plaintiffs home during "sacred" time of childbirth).
23. 141 U.S. 250 (1891) (referring to the "sacred" common law right to control
one's person and refusing to order a female litigant to submit to a medical examination). For a discussion of these and other gendered images of privacy, see Anita
Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 441 (1990).
24. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 349, 352 (1868).
25. See id.at 353 ("We will not inflict upon society the greater evil of raising the
curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence."); Siegel,
supra note 18, at 2151-70 (offering an extensive discussion and critique of the role
of marital privacy in the case law).
26. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON

1999]

RECONSTRUCTIVE TASKS

1765

To strengthen the case for privacy, liberalism and liberal feminism should carry forward three reconstructive projects that relate to these reasons for feminist resistance to privacy: (1) bolster liberalism's normative account of the value of privacy and
the human goods that it helps to secure; (2) offer a persuasive
argument for the continuing importance of some form of the
public/private distinction; and (3) explore how best to conceive of
privacy not merely as a negative liberty, but as requiring a conception of governmental responsibility to secure the preconditions for enjoying privacy and exercising autonomy (or "private
choice"). Allen's essay helpfully suggests these three projects;
moreover, her normative theorizing about privacy makes a substantial contribution to them. 7 I also draw on some of my own
recent work on liberal justifications for toleration to suggest
ways to fortify the case for privacy. Finally, taking the project to
be reconstruction, I suggest valuable lessons from the Reconstruction era for contemporary imagery and understandings of
privacy.
A. Articulating the "Goods" of Privacy and Private Choice
Allen usefully distinguishes "[t]he liberal conception of privacy," or governmental respect for and protection of interests in
physical, informational, and proprietary privacy, from "[tihe liberal conception of private choice,"" or governmental protection of
decisional privacy-what I will at times call decisional privacy
or autonomy. At the outset, I would caution against her term
"private choice," because it unwittingly may trigger feminist criticisms of an atomistic model of the self, which assumes an unrealistic degree of isolation and independence in the decisionmak-

LIFE AND LAw 93, 96-97 (1987) (arguing that the logic of the constitutional right of
privacy leads to the conclusion that because government has no duty to intervene to
remove nongovernmental obstacles to a woman's exercise of reproductive choice, "government has a duty not to intervene" in the private sphere, in which women suffer
harm because of sex inequality); WEST, supra note 18, at 120-21 (characterizing modem liberal understanding of "ordered liberty" as that of "negative liberty" and noninterference with privacy).
27. See Allen, supra note 1, at 739-40, 749, 753-54. For examples of Allen's normative work on privacy, see ALLEN, supra note 14; Allen, Privacy, supra note 16;
Allen, The Jurispolitics of Privacy, supra note 16.
28. Allen, supra note 1, at 723-24.
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ing process. Allen, however, embraces a version of liberalism
that sensibly "understands persons as shaped partly and substantially by social forces not of their own choosing, but also and
importantly by their own choices-their own decisions, commitments, and compromises." 9 Accordingly, I understand her to use
the modifier "private" to mean independence from government,
rather than from the inevitable influences of culture and other
persons. Thus, in this Essay, I will employ Allen's privacy/private choice distinction, but at times I will use the formulation
"privacy in its various dimensions" to capture both privacy and
private choice.
In any event, this distinction between privacy and private
choice is useful because it suggests that when we use the term
"privacy" to refer to "private choice," "privacy" really is a standin for decisional privacy, or deliberative autonomy, which is a
fundamental aspect of personal self-government." Allen's conception of "private choice" thus seems compatible with, for example, Ronald Dworkin's argument that liberalism is premised on
ethical individualism and moral independence; 3 on such an account, government "must not dictate what its citizens think
about matters of political or moral or ethical judgment." 2
Put this way, arguments for private choice likely will bear an
obvious and close resemblance to arguments in support of liberal
toleration; that is, arguments for a principle of restraint from
coercive governmental action within a realm of individual liberty
of belief, choice, and conduct.33 Elsewhere, I have advanced a
liberal feminist model of toleration as respect (as contrasted
with a model of "empty" toleration) that rests upon three justifications: the anti-compulsion rationale, the jurisdictional ratio-

29. Id- at 753-54.
30. For the formulation of "deliberative autonomy" as an interpretation of the
right to privacy, see James E. Fleming, Securing DeliberativeAutonomy, 48 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 2, 7-16 (1995) (advancing a constitutional theory with two fundamental
themes of securing the preconditions for democratic self-government, or deliberative
democracy, and personal self-government, or deliberative autonomy).
31. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 25-26, 250-54 (1996).

32. Id at 26.
33. Allen herself notes this connection between liberal toleration and governmental
protection of private choice. See Allen, supra note 1, at 732-33.
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nale, and the diversity rationale.34 In brief, these three rationales are, respectively: the idea that compulsion or coercion corrupts belief or choice and violates autonomy; 5 the idea that
there is a realm of personal belief, choice, and conduct that is
not the proper "business" of government to regulate; 6 and the
idea that it is inevitable that people freely exercising their moral
powers will choose and pursue different or diverse ways of life,
and that achieving orthodoxy would require an objectionable
level of governmental coercion.3" I think that liberalism readily
supports these justifications for toleration, although they can and
should be clarified and fortified in ways that I silggest below.
Do these rationales offer any guidance concerning the goods of
privacy? All of them ultimately rest on a normative conception of
personhood that includes an entitlement to autonomy and moral
independence.3 " The paradigmatic case for liberal toleration
stems from the cautionary tale of religious intolerance and persecution, and Europe's wars of religion. 9 Some liberal scholars
use the backdrop of religious intolerance to argue that liberty of
conscience undergirds our constitutional order and, specifically,
the right of privacy concerning a range of significant personal
decisions.4" Constitutional jurisprudence concerning the protection and scope of such decisional privacy, or autonomy, also deploys all three rationales. 4 '
The evil of religious intolerance is, undeniably, a powerful
paradigm that should continue to inform arguments about the
value of private choice. However, one way to fortify liberal arguments about the value of privacy and private choice is to look to
other paradigms. One potentially powerful paradigm is the legacy of slavery's denial of privacy and private choice to enslaved

34. See McClain, Toleration, supra note 3, at 42-131.
35. See id at 42-65.
36. See idtat 65-100.
37. See id at 100-31.
38. See id.at 132.
39. See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 13-17 (Patrick Romanell
ed., 2d ed. 1955) (1689); JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxiv-xxviii (1993).
40. See generally DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 26180 (1986) (discussing the relationships between privacy and abortion, and between
privacy and sexual autonomy).
41. See McClain, Toleration, supra note 3, at 42-131.

768

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:759

men and women.42 Recent scholarship on the Reconstruction
Amendments suggests significant commonality among abolitionism, feminism, and the struggle for gay and lesbian rights.4 Another related, but underdeveloped, paradigm (as Allen's work
suggests) is the legacy of the denial of meaningful forms of privacy to free women. Both of these "roots" of privacy would enrich our conceptual understanding of its origins and importance.
The first paradigm suggests that we might better understand
the normative value of privacy in its various dimensions in light
of the fundamental contrast between slavery and liberty. Professor Peggy Davis, for example, argues that the Supreme Court's
articulation of the right to privacy (i.e., the Court's appeal to
"penumbras" of privacy in the constitutional text 45) always has
seemed rather thin and unsatisfying, and that what is missing
is the "neglected stories" of enslaved families and the motivational effect of such stories upon the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments. 46 Put another way, a central feature of slavery was "social death,"47 and the denial to enslaved persons of
rights of moral autonomy and self-definition, including the
rights to marry, to bear or not bear children, to rear children,
and to bodily integrity.' Invoking Orlando Patterson's argument
that people in Western societies "'came to value freedom [and] to
construct it as a powerful shared vision of life, as a result of
their experience of, and response to, slavery,'" Davis argues that
"[t]he presence of the unfree was a profound argument for recognition of human autonomy."49 So reconstructed, deliberative
autonomy, or private choice, underwritten by the Fourteenth
Amendment, finds a potent undergirding in the experiences of
slavery and antislavery.
In an illuminating new book, liberal constitutional theorist
David Richards links the legacy of religious intolerance and the

42. See DAVIS, supra note 4, at 214-49.
43. See DAVID A. J. RIcHARDs, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE
GROUNDS FOR FEMINISM AND GAY RIGHTS IN CULTURE AND LAw 11-13 (1998).
44. See Allen, supra note 1, at 741-46.
45. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
46. DAVIS, supra note 4, at 214-49.
47. Id- at 236-37 (invoking the work of Orlando Patterson).
48. See id. at 226-27, 236-37.
49. 1o at 236 (quoting ORLANDO PATTERSON, 1 FREEDOM xiii (1991)).
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legacy of slavery by deploying the central themes of an inalienable right to conscience and of "moral slavery" to analyze the
injustice of the denial of rights to enslaved men and women, free
women, and gay men and lesbians.5" Abolitionist feminists condemned as "moral slavery" the "laws, institutions, conventions,
practices, and attitudes that illegitimately abridged the human
rights of conscience, speech, association, and work, and rationalized a servile status on that basis."5 1 Using this "interpretive
analogy between race and gender" illuminates that the Reconstruction Amendments affirm the "equal status of all persons as
"both slavery and rightsbearers of human rights" and condemn
52
basis."
that
on
subjugation
denying
In delineating the harms flowing from the denial of personal
self-government, both Davis and Richards offer a helpful conception of the self that holds promise for a liberal-and liberal feminist-account of the value of privacy and private choice: they
speak of persons as social beings, both shaped by and shaping
culture. Slavery, Davis argues, denied to enslaved persons a
right to participate in civil society, or in the dialectic of cultural
constraint and change, and the opportunity to make meaning."s
Abolitionist feminists, Richards contends, condemned moral
slavery based on race or sex as subjecting persons to the will of
others and stripping persons of "the human and cultural resources through which we acknowledge persons, as persons, capable of freedom and reason in private and public life."54
Similarly, intolerance of gay men and lesbians, manifested in
discriminatory laws and the denial of same-sex marriage, rests
on an unjust gender orthodoxy that denies such persons access
to cultural resources necessary to the free development of moral
personality and "the right to name, let alone claim, the intimate
life that is the basic human right of all other persons."5 Constitutional protection of deliberative autonomy in such matters as
marriage, parenting, and procreation are "measures that confer

50. See RICHARDS, supra note 43, at 3, 352-53.
51. Id at 261.

52. Id. at 262-63.
53. See DAVIS, supra note 4, at 234-38.
54. RICHARDS, supra note 43, at 261.

55. Id-at 353.
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social agency."56 This model of the self also seems to resonate
with liberal conceptions of revisability-or the capacity to form,
act on, and revise a conception of the good-and with
postmodern
feminist notions of social construction and "partial"
57
agency.
Looking to the legacy of slavery helps to undergird the value
of private choice and of privacy in the sense of seclusion, restricted access, and the like. As Allen has noted, and as such
feminist scholars as Patricia Hill Collins and Adrienne Davis
have examined, African-American women have suffered the denial of both private choice and privacy: slavery involved the
commodification and expropriation of their labor, sexuality, and
reproductive capacity; the failure to afford them protection of
their bodily integrity against rape and forced reproduction; and
the treatment of their bodies as items of public (indeed, pornographic) display.5 8 Against such a history, as feminist scholar
Dorothy Roberts has argued, privacy, in the sense of governmental noninterference, is an important precondition for protecting
the personhood of African-American women. 9 Further, against

56. DAVIS, supra note 4, at 236.
57. For a discussion of liberal revisability, see WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COmIMvUNITY, AND CULTURE (1989); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); Nancy L. Rosenblum,
Pluralism and Self-Defense, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 207 (Nancy L.
Rosenblum ed., 1989). For postmodern feminist models of partial agency, see
Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1999) [hereinafter Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency]; Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUm. L. REV. 304 (1995); Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1657 (1997).
58. See, e.g., PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 163-80 (1991) (discussing the
"sexual politics," rooted in slavery and sexual violence, that has oppressed AfricanAmerican women); Adrienne D. Davis, Commodification and Coercion: Enslaved
Women and the Antebellum Sexual Economy (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (examining antebellum sexual economy) [hereinafter Davis, Commodification
and Coercion]; see also ALLEN, supra note 14, at 64 (describing how many slave
masters considered sexual favors part of a slave woman's normal duties). Against
this backdrop of commodification and coercion, Adrienne Davis explores how the antebellum private law of wealth transmission dealt with attempts by white slave owners to transfer wealth to formerly enslaved women with whom they had sexual relationships and their children. See Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and
Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
59. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 1481. Roberts also argues, however, for a con-
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this history of "commodification and coercion "" and the backdrop
of the representation of African-American women as unchaste,
promiscuous, and animalistic, the goods of privacy-with its protection of restricted access and secrecy-and of private choice
hold powerful appeal.6 '
The second, related paradigm begins with the legacy of the
denial of meaningful privacy to women (especially within marriage). Notwithstanding feminist critiques of privacy, Allen's important work on the normative value of privacy and private
choice for women suggests that we might enlist women's experiences with "bad" forms of privacy and the absence of "significant
opportunities" for privacy and private choice to argue for the
goods of privacy." She persuasively argues that an adequate
account of privacy should rid itself of the legacy of domestic life
as the sphere of confinement, subordination, and sacrifice of
self.6 One part of women's privacy problem has been too much
of the wrong kind of privacy-unwanted isolation, the legacy of
separate spheres and of norms of maternal self-sacrifice, the
brutal injustice of the law's drawing the curtain on private life,
and leaving married women largely unprotected against intimate violence.6 ' As Allen has argued, women have not had
enough of the right kind of privacy.65 "Privacy" can play a significant role in fostering self-development and affording a space in
which persons prepare themselves for roles, relationships, and

ception of privacy that includes affirmative governmental obligations. See id. at
1478-79.
60. Davis, Commodification and Coercion, supra note 58 (manuscript at 32).
61. See COLLINS, supra note 58, at 67-78, 163-80 (describing such depictions of
African-American women). Conversations with Professor Adrienne Davis, who is
working on an article about black women's sexuality, were helpful on this point. For
example, this history may help explain black women's comparative reticence about
sexuality. See, e.g., Rosemary L. Bray, Taking Sides Against Ourselves, N.Y. TZIES,
Nov. 17, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 56 (suggesting that Anita Hill's self-presentation
evoked African-American women's vigorous fight for respectability and propriety).
62. See ALLEN, supra note 14, at 180-81.
63. See /a at 54-55 (contending that the "privacy" women historically have had
within the home largely has been illusory due to their maternal duties and dependence on their husbands).
64. See iaL at 54-55; Siegel, supra note 18, at 2153-61 (explaining how the concept
of marital privacy replaced chastisement as a legal justification for the state's failure
to prosecute those who physically abused their wives).
65. See ALLEN, supra note 14, at 181.
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responsibilities, while allowing the realization of goods such as
solitude, chosen intimacy, and retreat.6 6 "Private choice," or decisional privacy, can allow women the development and exercise of
their moral powers.67
In effect, what privacy affords is the literal and metaphorical
space or opportunity for self-development or self-constitution, as
well as for revision of the self. I believe (as does Allen) that this
idea of privacy is compatible with a dialectical model of the self
as shaped by, but also shaping, culture. 6' As Allen humorously
expresses this important facet of privacy: "Surely my privacy
means more than that others should let me alone to be the best
darn African-American, Methodist, suburban wife and mother I
can be. Privacy is also a matter of freedom to escape, reject, and
modify such identities."69 Given feminism's interest in women's
freedom to re-evaluate and escape oppressive connections,70 this
facet of privacy should be attractive.
Of course, one vulnerability of sorting out "good" and "bad"
kinds of privacy is that such a process might suggest that privacy is so indeterminate and unruly a conception that it is neither
stable nor useful. 7 ' Liberals and liberal feminists might appear
to be saying to their critics, "Oh, but we don't mean that kind of
privacy. Trust us, we mean this kind of privacy." To this, I have
three basic responses. First, as with any legal and cultural concept subject to evolving understandings (e.g., liberty and equality), although we need to subject the various deployments of privacy in law and culture and its role in our social practices to
critical scrutiny, it does not follow that we should abandon the
concept completely.72 Second, to equate deployments of privacy

66. See Allen, supra note 1, at 744-45; see also ALLEN, supra note 14, at 75 (describing "a degree of personal privacy" as "an important underpinning of female
personhood," but as not "preclud[ing] concern for others").
67. See ALLEN, supra note 14, at 82-122.
68. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 1, at 753-54.
69. Ik at 754.
70. See Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the
Community, in FEMINISM & COMMUNITY 193-99 (Penny A. Weiss & Marilyn Friedman eds., 1995); Susan H. Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72
IND. L.J. 417, 440-46 (1997).
71. See Fleming, supra note 30, at 1, 41 (criticizing claims that privacy is too unruly or undomesticated a notion to be useful in constitutional law and theory).
72. See, e.g., id. at 57-59 (arguing for an approach to due process liberty that
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that have legitimated patriarchy and impaired women's equal
citizenship with liberalism ignores the extent to which fundamental liberal principles, and certainly liberal feminist principles, should serve instead as an indictment of those deployments
(as discussed below concerning the problem of "private" violence).73 Third, related concepts such as autonomy (or self-determination), self-development, and self-constitution may help get
at the goods that privacy helps to secure 'without carrying all the
negative associations.7 4
Feminist condemnation of privacy raises the "substantive moral and political question" of whether women have "no interest in
the values of privacy and intimacy," or in keeping the state out
of their lives in at least some circumstances.7 ' Allen's normative
work on the value of privacy for women moves a considerable
distance toward answering that question. I am in general agreement with her two-fold conclusion: feminists have good reason to
be critical of "what the privacy of the private sphere has signified for women in the past and what the rhetoric and jurisprudence of privacy rights can signal for the future."76 "At the same
time, there is little doubt that women seeking greater control
over their lives already have begun to benefit from heightened
social respect for appropriate forms of physical, informational,
proprietary, and decisional privacy."77 Both privacy and private

evaluates traditions not only by reference to historical practices but also in light of
aspirational principles).
73. See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
74. Some other feminists share this view. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE 49-54 (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) [hereinafter PUBLIC NATURE]
(using such terms as "the right to autonomy, self-expression, and self-determination"
to capture the affirmative potential of privacy). Some constitutional theorists view
the right of privacy as a misnomer, and suggest that autonomy is really at the core
of Fourteenth Amendment liberty. See DAVIS, supra note 4, at 238; LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AIERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1341-45 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing
constitutional protection of a woman's choice regarding abortion).
75. Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/PrivateDistinction, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1, 36 (1992). As Allen answers this question, "[t]he longing for personal time and
personal decisionmaking can linger long after the grip of patriarchy over women's
bodies and lives is loosened." Allen, supra note 1, at 750.
76. Allen, supra note 1, at 750.
77. Id; see also ALLEN, supra note 14, at 70-72 (arguing that the fact that male
hegemony and female inequality have residual effects on women's full enjoyment of
privacy and private choice does not warrant the complete rejection of privacy and
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choice are important to the goal of women being free, equal,
safe, and intimate.
In grappling with the question of the best vocabulary for expressing some of these ideals, it might be useful to look to the
history of feminism for analogues to what Professor Peggy Davis
calls "Motivating Stories" 7S-that is, to see how women's accounts of experience with bad forms of privacy that denied them
autonomy and rendered them vulnerable to violence and abuse
(such as the law of coverture and the ideology of separate
spheres 9 ) motivated legal and social steps toward securing better forms of privacy for them. For instance, one plausible interpretation of nineteenth-century feminist demands for "a right
to Self-ownership in marriage" ° and a "voluntary marriage"8 is
to view them as demands, in effect, for privacy and private
choice-i.e., for control of intimate access, freedom from the sovereignty of another, and respect for bodily integrity. As Richards's work suggests, abolitionist feminism would be a rich resource for such "motivating stories." 2 Richards characterizes the
legacy of abolitionist feminism's indictment of "moral slavery"
for more contemporary rights-based feminism in terms of its call
for basic, inalienable rights of conscience, speech, intimate life,
and work, and its indictment of injustice in women's intimate
lives. 3 These basic rights, some of which find embodiment in
contemporary constitutional rights of privacy and private choice,
are "culture-creating rights" (consistent with the dialectical

private choice). As Professor Allen has argued elsewhere, even if the origins of the
privacy tort rest in part on "outmoded conceptions of female modesty and domesticity," contemporary judicial vindication of women's privacy interests need not rest on
such conceptions. See Allen & Mack, supra note 23, at 473-77.
78. DAVIS, supra note 4, at 213.
79. For a helpful discussion of the influence of the common-law doctrine of coverture and of separate spheres ideology upon women's social and legal status in the
early American republic and in the nineteenth century, see SEx DISCRIMIINATION AND
THE LAW: HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND THEORY 3-80 (Barbara Babcock et al. eds., 2d ed.
1996).
80. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 305 (1992).

81. MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, FEMINISM, MARRIAGE, AND THE LAW IN VICTORIAN
ENGLAND 187-88 (1989).
82. See RICHARDS, supra note 43, at 63-124 (describing features of abolitionist
feminism).
83. See id. at 19-24.
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account of the self advanced above): they afford "appropriate
space for the free exercise of our powers of moral personality,"
including "responsibly creating, forging, and sustaining" cultural
and institutional forms.84 They also call for the repudiation of
conceptions of private life that have contributed to the oppression of women. 5 Similarly, some recent feminist legal scholarship on the problem of intimate violence against women suggests that women's experience of that problem, and of their lack
of meaningful privacy and autonomy, should undergird the reconstruction of conceptions of privacy and autonomy in a way
that attends to the material and social preconditions for their
enjoyment.8 6
Ultimately, feminist critiques of privacy highlight the need to
sort out "dubious uses of the notion of privacy" 7 and to reject
the invocation of the values of privacy to "mask exploitation and
abuse." 8 The reconstructive task is to build the normative case
for privacy and autonomy as valuable, and perhaps indispensable, elements in a conception of free and equal citizenship for
women as well as men. By appealing to liberal toleration, abolitionism, and feminism, as well as to the creative resonances
among them, we may be able to reconstruct the roots of privacy
and offer some alternative images of it. In so doing, we can better express why the right to be let alone may be the right most
valued by "civilized" women as well as men.8 9

84. Id at 234. Richards also addresses the important history of how certain abolitionist feminists compromised their original antiracist stance and of how some of the
most radical feminist demands for gender equality narrowed to a focus upon suffrage. See ii at 125-98.
85. See id at 253 (describing how, for second wave feminists, " t]he privatization
of women was . . . the basis for their oppression. Work in the public sphere became
a metaphor for the legitimate entrance of women into public culture on equal terms
as bearers of inalienable human rights.").
86. See Schneider, supra note 74, at 49-54 (proposing to reconstruct privacy in
light of battered women's experiences); Wendy Webster Williams, Fixing Locke: Liberal Orthodoxies and the Feminist Challenge to Intimate Violence (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (exploring reconstruction of liberal autonomy
in light of the needs and goals of battered women).
87. Gavison, supra note 75, at 35.
88. Id at 37.
89. I refer, of course, to Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 195; see also
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that "the right to be let alone [is] . . . the right most valued by civilized men").
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B. The PublicIPrivate Distinction:Avoiding Misconceptions
An adequate liberal account of privacy requires a persuasive
articulation, rather than abdication, of a public/private distinction. To use Allen's formulation, this is the important task of
rescuing the public and the private,"° which requires a liberal
framework within which "public and private are contingent,
transformable conceptions of how power ought best to be allocated among individuals, social groups, and government." 9 Perhaps
the most forceful and pervasive feminist criticism of privacyand of the public/private distinction-stems from its role in allowing unjust and hierarchical distributions of power between
men and women that have left women subject to the "private
sovereignty" of men. 2 For example, Professor Reva Siegel's historical analysis of the evolving legal treatment of violence
against women in the home powerfully demonstrates how, even
after the law's formal repudiation of the idea of coverture and a
husband's right to administer "chastisement" to his wife, and
even after the evolution from a model of authoritarian marriage
to companionate marriage, courts continued to use the concept of
"affective" or marital privacy to shield the home from public exposure, leaving women without a remedy against intimate violence.9 3 An adequate account of governmental noninterference
with private choice and private life must condemn this invocation of privacy to immunize private violence.
As the work of Siegel and other feminist theorists amply illustrates, it is undeniable that historical doctrines of family privacy
and the sanctuary of the marital bedroom have contributed to
the unequal protection of women in their homes and sanctioned
enormous injustices to women and children within the family.94
As I have explained elsewhere, however, a liberal commitment
to a principle of personal sovereignty, or a realm of autonomy,
does not entail an unqualified jurisdictional principle of govern-

90. See Allen, supra note 1, at 749.
91. 1i at 750.
92. See WEST, supra note 18, at 45-72.
93. See Siegel, supra note 18, at 2142-70.
94. See ALLEN, supra note 14, at 117; Siegel, supra note 18, at 2153; Taub &
Schneider, supra note 18, at 328-39.
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mental noninterference with "private" life.9" With the notable
exceptions of John Stuart and Harriet Taylor Mill, liberal political theorists historically have paid inadequate attention to the
problem of unequal power in the "private" sphere. I believe these
are sins of omission rather than fatal flaws of liberalism. 96 As
John Rawls has said of political liberalism, in response to Susan
Moller Okin's critique of its apparent stance of toleration of injustice within the family, 97 "[i]f the so-called private sphere is
alleged to be a space exempt from justice, then there is no such
thing," for "[tihe equal rights of women and the basic rights of
their children as future citizens are inalienable and protect them
wherever they are."" Nor do constitutional privacy rights, contrary to some feminist arguments, plausibly support the notion
of a private sphere within which government abdicates any refor protecting women against abuses of power by
sponsibility
9
men.

9

Liberal feminists' internal critiques of liberalism have an important ongoing role to play in reconstructing liberal conceptions
of the public/private distinction and insisting upon application of
liberal principles in ways that are consistent with feminist commitment to ending subordination on the basis of sex. For example, the home and "domestic" relations are, indeed, proper subjects of legal regulation and implicate institutions of civil society
in which government has considerable interest."0 Governmental
responsibility to protect women against violence in their homes
should follow readily from a liberal state's core commitment to
protect its citizens against private aggression. i Oi Accordingly, in
95. See McClain, Toleration, supra note 3, at 73-76.
96. I am indebted to John Rawls for suggesting this line of response.
97. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 90-93 (1989).
98. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765, 791
(1997).
99. For discussion, see McClain, Inviolability, supra note 3, at 215-20; McClain,
Toleration, supra note 3, at 73-76; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 898 (1992) (striking down spousal notification requirement because it gave husband "troubling degree of authority over his wife," and stating that in keeping with
the rejection of the common-law understanding of women's role within the family,
"[wiomen do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry");
Schneider, supra note 74, at 57 n.21 (discussing male defendants' unsuccessful invocation of constitutional privacy precedents to support marital rape exemption).
100. See Allen, supra note 1, at 749-50; Rawls, supra note 98, at 791.
101. See Jane Maslow Cohen, Private Violence and Public Obligation, in PUBLIC
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the case of violence against women. within the family, liberal
feminists correctly indict the ways in which earlier liberal political theory about the marriage contract and family governance
contributed to the failure to keep this "most fundamental promise of the social contract."'0 2 Liberals and liberal feminists vehemently oppose unjust status hierarchies, such as those based on
sex and race, which undermine self-development, the exercise of
03
moral powers, and free and equal citizenship.'
All of this probably sounds familiar, perhaps even too familiar. Reconstructing privacy requires moving beyond restating
such rebuttals to feminist critiques of privacy. If they have not
already done so, liberals should readily grant that an adequate
conception of privacy in its various dimensions must clearly reject privacy's legacy of confinement and subordination, as well
as the immunity of private aggression from the law's reach. The
reconstructive task for an adequate liberal-and liberal feminist-model of privacy requires a normative argument as to why
society should honor some form of public/private distinction and
some limiting principles that admit of an appropriate role for
governmental regulation of "private" life, "private" places, and
"private" relationships.
Setting those limiting principles is, of course, a formidable
challenge: many of us probably recoil from judicial rhetoric used
to justify not "raising the curtain"' on the bedchamber to subject intimate violence to public exposure (and legal redress), 5
but warm to the judicial defense of privacy against the specter of
police enforcement of sexual and reproductive norms in the
bedchamber.'
The correct answer to Professor Ruth Gavison's

NATURE, supra note 74, at 364-66, 370-71; Williams, supra note 86; see also EILEEN
L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT
(1996) (arguing that this central liberal commitment requires government to aid
women in terminating pregnancies to which they do not consent).
102. Williams, supra note 86.
103. See RICHARDS, supra note 43, at 67-70, 250-52; see generally Cynthia V. Ward,
The Radical Feminist Defense of Individualism, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 871 (1995) (arguing that gender-based hierarchies are antithetical to many of the basic tenets of liberalism).
104. State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 349, 352 (1868).
105. See Siegel, supra note 18, at 2150-75 (discussing Rhodes and other cases).
106. I refer here to Justice Douglas's famous language in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred pre-
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question as to whether there are any "contexts in which women
would want to keep the state out of their lives" 107 should be, emphatically, yes! Moreover, a careful reading of much feminist
work supports that conclusion.' 8 We need liberal, and liberal
feminist, arguments properly "clarified" to avoid absolutist misconceptions equating privacy with complete immunity and governmental abdication of responsibility. As Siegel's work suggests, such a reconstruction should repudiate the idea that
"where love is, law need not be. Intimacy occurs in a domain
having no bearing on matters of citizenship."0 9 To the contrary,
feminist reform efforts correctly target violence in the home as
an impediment to women's equal citizenship and redefine it as a
matter of public concern warranting governmental responses." 0
Those efforts have borne fruit, such as changed state laws and
the federal Violence Against Women Act."' There must be ongoing vigilance over use of conceptions of privacy and the public/
private distinction, however, to guard against blunting the scope
of those reforms."
cincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very
idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."),
as well as to Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 208
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe right of an individual to conduct intimate
relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home seems to me to be the heart of
the Constitution's protection of privacy.").
107. Gavison, supra note 75, at 37.
108. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 14, at 57-59, 97-122 (discussing importance to
women of privacy of the home and of freedom from governmental interference with
reproductive liberty); DAVIS, supra note 4, at 213-49 (advancing argument for governmental noninterference with moral autonomy in matters of intimate association, family, and reproduction). In contrast, feminist legal theorist Martha Fineman highlights
the desirability of privacy in the sense of protection against state intervention in
family life by showing the absence of such protection for certain "public" families
(i.e., those headed by single mothers), but concludes that existing privacy doctrine
premised upon the "sexual" family (i.e., the marital bond) is unlikely to afford single
mothers such protection. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER,
THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TwENTETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 177-93 (1995).

109. Siegel, supra note 18, at 2205-06 (characterizing assumptions regarding love
and intimacy undergirding nineteenth-century interspousal immunity).
110. See Cohen, supra note 101, at 370-79; Sally F. Goldfarb, Public Rights for
'Private"Wrongs: Sexual Harassmentand the Violence Against Women Act, in SEXUAL
HARASShmENT (working title) (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., forthcoming 2000).
111. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified in various sections of 8, 16, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
112. See Goldfarb, supra note 110, at 16; Siegel, supra note 18, at 2201-07.
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C. Beyond Negative Liberty: Government's Responsibility for a
"FormativeProject"
Finally, an adequate liberal and feminist conception of privacy
and private choice requires more than a defense of negative liberty. As Allen helpfully suggests, we should not give up on privacy as "freedom to" (or "claim to") rather than simply "freedom
from."1 13 Liberalism correctly insists that governmental respect
for negative liberty is a necessary condition for autonomy, or
But perfectionist work, emanating
personal self-government.'
not only from feminist and civic republican sources, but also
from within liberalism itself, suggests that merely leaving persons alone may not be sufficient to ensure meaningful self-government." 5 Perfectionists usefully direct attention to the need
for a conception of governmental responsibility to secure the pre116
conditions for enjoying privacy and exercising private choice.
Civic republican political theorist Michael Sandel speaks of the
importance of a "formative project" or "formative politics,"
whereby government inculcates in citizens the qualities of character and the virtues necessary for self-government. 117 As I have
written elsewhere, a common theme in civic republican, feminist, and liberal perfectionism is a call for a formative project
responsibility to help citizens live
that involves governmental
l8
good, self-governing lives."
113. Allen, supra note 1, at 748.
114. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal ProtectionFix for Abortion Law:
Reflections on Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 419, 443-44 (1995).
115. By perfectionism, I refer to the idea that government has a responsibility to
shape or steer citizens pursuant to a vision of human virtue, goods, or excellence.
For example, Joseph Raz, who rejects liberal "neutrality" concerning the good life in
favor of a pluralistic perfectionist liberalism, argues that it is a proper function of
government to promote morality and that personal autonomy is a central moral principle that government should promote. See JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM

407-18 (1986). Political liberalism, as advanced by John Rawls, aims to develop a
political conception of justice in order to establish fair terms of social cooperation
among citizens on the basis of mutual respect and trust, without government embracing or attempting to secure agreement upon any comprehensive moral doctrine.
See RAWLS, supra note 39, at 173-76. For a more detailed comparison of perfectionist liberalism and political liberalism, see McClain, Toleration, supra note 3.
116. See RAZ, supra note 115, at 417-18 (arguing for governmental responsibility to
foster the conditions of autonomy).
117. See SANDEL, supra note 11, at 6, 305.
118. See Mclain, Toleration, supra note 3, at 33-40.
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How can liberal conceptions of privacy and private choice be
reconstructed to yield governmental commitment to securing
preconditions for their enjoyment? What role might privacy in
its various dimensions play in a liberal/liberal feminist formative project? Allen offers some helpful clues while raising some
challenging questions about the proper scope of such a project.
In her book, Uneasy Access, she repeatedly refers to the importance of women having "meaningful opportunities for personal
privacy"1 19 and concludes by pointing to the need to seek to understand the legal, economic, and social bases of meaningful privacy and private choice. 20 In her present article, she envisions
government's formative project largely in terms of the education
of persons "who understand human capacities for choice and the
limits of those capacities." 2 ' Allen's conception of privacy and
private choice posits an affirmative governmental responsibility
because of her "egalitarian and feminist" assumption that "a
background of educational, economic, and sexual equality is a
requirement of meaningful choice": "In a just and liberal democracy, one's ability to choose how one shall live will be constrained through taxation and regulation so that others can
achieve a comparable palette of choices."' 22
Allen poses some intriguing quandaries over government's
formative project that relate not only to the value of privacy but
also to important questions over the desirability of "neutral" liberalism versus perfectionist liberalism. She expresses concern
over Jenni and Sara, young women who have established
websites from which paying customers can observe them in their
homes, and their voluntary exposure of self and "private" space
for consumption.' 23 For example, Allen suggests that Jenni

119. ALLEN, supra note 14, at 80.

120. See id. at 80-81, 181.
121. Allen, supra note 1, at 754.
122. Id,; see also RAZ, supra note 115, at 417-18 (supporting government's entitlement to redistribute resources to promote citizens' autonomy). This egalitarian, feminist, and redistributive rendering of liberalism has some resonance with postinodern
feminist arguments that, while everyone is subject to the forces of social construction, "some groups of people systematically and structurally have more power to do
the constructing than do others." Nancy J. Hirschmann, Toward A Feminist Theory
of Freedom, 24 POL. THEORY 46, 57 (1996). Accordingly, an adequate conception of
freedom requires giving those with less power the material and cultural resources
needed to enhance their ability to participate in the processes of self-construction.
123. See Allen, supra note 1, at 731-32.
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should turn off the camera "so that, free from the gaze of others,
she can live a more genuinely expressive and independent
life." 124 In effect, Allen concludes that this is not a good way for
Jenni to live and that Jenni is not making appropriate use of
her opportunities for privacy and private choice. Allen makes
even stronger claims concerning the link between privacy and
citizenship, suggesting that Jenni's degree of self-disclosure may
be incompatible with her capacity for citizenship.2 5
What are the parameters of a formative project that is to foster the preconditions for democratic and personal self-government, while also showing respect for the exercise of individual
autonomy (or private choice)? If Jenni and Sara do not understand their own best interests, 26 perhaps it is due to norms of
sexuality or femininity, which they may be powerless, individually, to change. Some feminists and liberals show considerable
interest in government engaging in "norm management" to
shape and change social norms and meanings, and to alter preferences. 127 Allen's article suggests, in addition, that privacy
should be among those goods (like equality and autonomy-or,
as some feminists prefer, "agency" 2 ') that are so important to
society that government should not be neutral about them. 29 Instead, Allen argues, government should seek to educate persons
that privacy is an indispensable component of a good life, and
even steer them toward privacy when they appear to discard it. 30
Allen recognizes the apparent tension between a liberal
commitment to freedom and a liberal regulation aimed at "forcing" people to choose and value private life. She attempts to reconcile this affirmative obligation by analogizing the surrender of
too much privacy to the consumption of harmful drugs.' 3 ' To the
extent that doing each activity exceeds rational capacity, liberal

124. Id- at 753.
125. See id at 750-53.
126. Put another way, they may fail to understand their own "critical interests."
See generally Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in XI THE TANNER
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALuEs 1, 44-46 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1990) (formulating a
distinction between volitional and critical interests).
127. See, e.g., Higgins, supra note 57, at 1700-03; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms
and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1996).
128. See, e.g., Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency, supra note 57.
129. See Allen, supra note 1, at 755.
130. See id. at 752-53.
131. See id. at 740.
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government may seek to prohibit or at least strongly discourage
it. I do not find the self-disclosure/drug analogy wholly persuasive, however, for it is not clear how relinquishing privacy
harms rational capacity and citizenship. I concur that privacy, in
the sense of private choice, or autonomy, is fundamental for liberal or liberal feminist citizenship; some accounts of liberalism,
indeed, treat autonomy as a basic moral good that government
should foster."3 2 I support a governmental formative project
aimed at fostering the capacity for, and addressing barriers to,
responsible self-government. A proper target of such a project
would be obstacles to the enjoyment of privacy (in the sense of
solitude, seclusion, and "down time"), such as women's disproportionate burden for domestic labor, child care, and lack of leisure time.'3 3 What, then, if people exercise their autonomy, or
private choice, by choosing not to be private?
Is Jenni incapable of being a good citizen? What if someone
offers up her privacy for consumption and profit, and uses the
money for her education or her family or donates it for progressive political causes?.3 4 Further, what if Jenni herself does not
believe she is giving up her privacy because, in her own words,
"[als long as what goes on inside my head is still private, I have
all the space I need."'35 What if Jenni uses her web site as a bully
pulpit to preach for or against privacy?

132. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text; see also Carlos A. Ball, Moral
Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEo. L.J. 1871, 1920 (1997) (endorsing Raz's liberal argument that the

state should "promote and encourage personal au-tonomy ... because it is a moral
good").
133. On women's "double burden" of domestic and market labor, see ARLiE
HOOHSCHILD, THE SEcoND SHirr (1989).
134. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193, 1266 (1998) (arguing against prohibiting a person from knowingly disclosing information for monetary compensation or other reasons).
135. JenniCam: Frequently Asked- Questions (visited Oct. 16, 1998) <http'J/www.
jennicam.org/faq/general.html>. The full text of the answer to the question, "Why are
you giving up your privacy like this?," is:

Because I don't feel I'm giving up my privacy. Just because people can
see me doesn't mean it affects me-I'm still alone in my head, no matter

what. And as long as what goes on inside my head is still private, I
have all the space I need. On the other hand, if someone invented a
TelepathyCam where you could hear everything I was thinking, I must
admit I'd be a bit more squeamish. *wink*
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Thus, although I doubt JenniCam renders Jenni incapable of
citizenship, I also grant that it is hard to link JenniCam with
core values of citizenship, or to find any relationship between
playing "name that curve" (of her body)'36 and responsible selfgovernment. Nonetheless, some of the justifications for privacy
and private choice are of special relevance here. Allen speaks of
the value of some sort of governmental neutrality concerning the
good life.' One could think of privacy as affording a symbolic as
well as literal space for diversity, wherein people could pursue
their different conceptions of the good life. Of course, this means
that privacy also protects people's right to be a layabout or to
spend time on pursuits that others deem trivial.'36 Is a "layabout"
or a "couch potato" more capable of self-government than someone like Jenni, who transforms her daily life, with all its trivia,
into an internet sitcom?3 9 If phenomena like JenniCam do warrant governmental regulation, I suspect that the reasons for
such regulation would less likely be concerns for preserving the
capacity for human citizenship than concerns for preserving dignity or decency, or even social order."'4
Even if not wholly persuasive, Allen's refreshing propositions
about shoring up privacy point to the need for further thinking

136. See Patricia J. Williams, Name that Curve, NATION, July 20, 1998, at 9 (discussing a recent contest on JenniCam involving the identification of a displayed body
part).
137. See Allen, supra note 1, at 752.
138. See ALLEN, supra note 14, at 75-78; MACEDO, supra note 57, at 227.

139. Research for this article included two visits to JenniCam, which are the basis
of my characterization of JenniCam as a sitcom. In addition to questions and an-

swers and photos of Jenni or, when she is absent, her empty apartment, there is
also Jenni's journal, in which she shares with website visitors the often trivial details of her daily life (somewhat like a letter to a pen pal). The mixture of trivial
detail and the occasional weightier matters (e.g., reflecting upon a past abusive relationship) reminded me of the hugely popular journal entries of the fictional young
woman Bridget Jones. See HELEN FIELDING, BRIDGET JONES'S DIARIES (1996).
140. In a recent article expressing alarm that the public airing of details of politicians' sexual conduct has become commonplace, philosopher Thomas Nagel warns
that American society "has lost its grip on a fundamental value" on which civilization depends, i.e., honoring the "distinction between what an individual exposes to
public view and what he conceals or exposes only to intimates." Thomas Nagel, The
Shredding of Public Privacy, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Aug. 14, 1998, at 15; cf
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 248-61 (1996)
(describing moralist arguments against such practices as surrogacy contracts, public
nudity, dwarf bowling, and dwarf tossing rooted in concern for dehumanization, degradation, moral offensiveness, and exploitation).
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about government's formative project. For example, which is indispensable: being private itself, or having the freedom to make
the decision to be private? Is "privacy," in the sense of solitude
and restricted access, a precondition for private choice? Is a
threshold level of privacy indispensable to a well-ordered society? Should governmental responsibility to foster conditions for
meaningful opportunities for privacy take the form of steering
citizens between better and worse uses of privacy, and between
embracing and rejecting privacy? It is important not just that
people choose, but that they "choose well," and that government
foster their ability to do so.141 How does government tell who is
choosing well and who is not? Allen notes that "[a] plurality of
notions of and opportunities for privacy must be permitted to
flourish.""" Will this include notions of the good life in which
privacy, in the sense of private life, plays a lesser role and selfdisclosure a greater role? Here we might remember Mill's argument that society benefits from allowing different "experiments
of living" to flourish.1" Allen herself views Jenni as a rather extreme case, and makes clear that not every act of privacy impairs citizenship. 1 " She notes that younger persons seem to live
good lives without as much privacy as older generations. 4 5 She
also recognizes that variables such as class and generational
status may shape one's "taste" for privacy, 146 and that paternalistic restrictions against offering up one's privacy for consumption may fall more harshly on some persons than on others.' 47
Delineating a formative project concerning privacy involves
addressing significant prudential questions. Allen recognizes
that "bad" forms of privacy have hindered women's opportunities
for equal citizenship. 1" As I suggest in Section Two, rejecting
privacy sometimes is a good thing and may foster a capacity for

141. See Martha Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE

GOOD 203, 229 (R. Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990).
142. Allen, supra note 1, at 755.
143. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 54 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859).

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See
See
See
See
See

Allen,
id. at
icL
id- at
id. at

supra note 1, at 752.
736.
734, 755.
755.
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meaningful participation in society. 149 For these reasons, as well
as ones that I set out elsewhere, a commitment to the core rationales for toleration, as well as liberal and feminist respect for
diversity and recognition of a morally pluralistic polity, may
commend a feminist form of political liberalism more than a
feminist form of perfectionist liberalism. 50 Such a hybrid, like
Allen's vision of liberalism, would focus upon fostering the capacities for democratic and personal self-government. Without a
stronger showing that choosing self-exposure over privacy impairs the capacity for democratic and personal self-government
and the achievement of equal citizenship, or threatens important
public values, we should be cautious about governmental moralizing in favor of privacy.

II. THE "TASTE" FOR PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF NEW
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES

An intriguing part of Allen's article is her proposition that,
despite the high esteem in which liberalism holds privacy, there
is "ain erosion of privacy-related tastes and expectations."' 5 '
She proposes that a governmental formative project that shores
up privacy and imposes privacy norms would be compatible with
liberal principles. 152 In Section One, I sketched a normative account of privacy in its various dimensions that gave a central
place to the capacity for revising and choosing, as well as rejecting, forms of connection. 5 I also suggested the importance of a
conception of privacy that allows for repudiating certain forms of
privacy and embracing others.'5 4 This way of thinking about pri-

149. See infra notes 164-78 and accompanying text.
150. It is unnecessary to adopt an explicitly perfectionist model of government to
hold that government has a responsibility to secure the preconditions for a person's
exercise of their moral powers necessary for democratic and personal self-govern-

ment. This may include not only facilitative measures but also persuasion, to the
extent that such persuasion fosters self-government or furthers public values (such
as racial equality and the equal citizenship of women). My resistance to perfectionism has to do with implementing it in a morally pluralistic society, e.g., identifying
whose account of the preconditions for a good life is to prevail. See McClain, Toleration, supra note 3, at 115-31.
151. Allen, supra note 1, at 730.
152. See i&L at 752-53.
153. See supra notes 28-86 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 87-112 and accompanying text.
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vacy may offer a helpful framework for considering issues related to self-exposure in cyberspace and, in particular, the related
issues of gender, privacy, and cyberspace. There, I raised questions about such a project. Here, I offer two brief responses to
Allen's diagnosis of a decreased taste for privacy. First, I question whether privacy is yet a seriously eroded taste. Second, I
suggest that, even if it is eroded to a certain degree, that may be
less cause for alarm than Allen suggests.
I will venture an interpretation of the ongoing debate over the
new communication technologies that is slightly at odds with
Allen's view. Far from having a diminished expectation of and
taste for privacy, people seem to have considerable concern over
threats to privacy posed by cyberspace and a continuing desire
for certain aspects of privacy. For example, there is a keen consumer interest in protecting personal information and maintaining anonymity in cyberspace, an interest also evident in scholarly and legislative efforts to protect privacy. 155 It is precisely the
possibility of anonymity and of restricting access to information
about oneself that makes communications in cyberspace so appealing to some. 1 56 While Allen raises concern that some women
have little taste for privacy, poll data suggest that among users
of the World Wide Web, privacy is the most important issue,1 57and
is even more important to female users than to male users.
A better reading may be that cyberspace provides new possibilities for privacy as well as self-disclosure, and for connection
and community as well as isolation. Indeed, it is the ability to
engage in selective disclosure of personal information that "in-

155. See, e.g., Encryption Protects the Rights of Individuals from Violation and
Abuse in Cyberspace (E-Privacy) Act, S. 2067, 105th Cong. (1998); Identity Theft and

Assumption Deterrence Act, S. 512, 105th Cong. (1997); Kang, supra note 134, at
1267-94 (proposing Cyberspace Privacy Act to protect individuals' informational privacy); William J. Fenrich, Note, Common Law Protection of Individual Rights in Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 961 (1996) (arguing for common-law

protection against unauthorized dissemination of personal information).
156. See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J.

869, 876-82 (1996); George P. Long, III, Note, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity
in Cyberspace, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1177, 1182-84 (1994).
157. Censorship is the most important issue to male users. See Graphics, Visualization & Usability Center, GVU's 8th WWW User Survey (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http'J/

www.gvu.gatech.edu/user_.surveystsurvey-1997-10>

(reporting survey of over 10,000

web users conducted from October 10, 1997 through November 16, 1997).
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vites and affirms intimacy"; loss of such control would hinder
the ability to construct "deep social relationships." 5 8 What could
be a more isolated act than surfing the web in the privacy of
one's own home? What act, though, could be more potentially
self-disclosing than communicating anonymously with others on
the web? For the lonely and isolated gay teenager, such an act
may provide an important source of community and connection.'5 9 We might think about cyberspace as affording new ways
of exercising private choice and decisionmaking about self-disclosure and concealment, as well as new opportunities voluntarily to play with one's identity. Recent scholarly work on gender
and cyberspace, for example, stresses women's efforts to create
networks of support, which often follow different values than
those prevalent in male-dominated spaces in cyberspace, as well
as to play with and construct oppositional identities. 6 ° With this
development come new and different forms of association and
connection.
Perhaps the contemporary interest in restricted access and
anonymity on the Internet shows the continuing appeal to privacy, but reconstructed for a new technological form. Perhaps what
consumers want-access to information and restricted access to
their own person and personal information-poses a hopelessly
conflicted task for privacy rules. If, as some contend, these technologies threaten the very idea of and possibility of privacy and
"private life" to a degree unrecognized by many who use them
and in ways not addressable by current privacy rules, they may
trigger serious regulatory questions.' 6 ' There are important

158. Kang, supra note 134, at 1212-13.
159. See Teemu Ruskola, Minor Disregard: The Legal Construction of the Fantasy
that Gay and Lesbian Youth Do Not Exist, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 269, 272 n.16
(1996).
160. A full treatment of this fascinating topic is outside the scope of this Essay.
For a helpful introduction, see Susan Herring, Posting in a Different Voice: Gender
and Ethics in Computer-Mediated Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION 115-45 (Charles Ess ed., 1996) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES]; Nina Wakeford, Networking Women and Grrrls with Information! Communication Technology, in PROCESSED LIVES: GENDER AND TECHNOLOGY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 51-66 (Jennifer Terry & Melodie Calvert eds., 1997). For an influential
feminist "cyborg manifesto" about the potential of the new communication technologies to break down boundaries and construct new identities, see DONNA J. HARAWAY,
SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN 149-81 (1991).
161. See John M. Broder, F.T.C. Opens Hearings on Computers' Threat to Privacy
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questions about the implications for participation in democratic
and civic life, particularly whether anonymous communication
fosters or hinders democracy and civil society. For example,
frank and blunt exchanges about race take place on the
Internet, and the very anonymity of these exchanges appears to
foster this dialogue. 162 To the extent anonymity brings with it a
sense of unaccountability for one's "anonymous" speech acts,
though, it may contribute to such problems as cyber-stalking,
harassment, and "virtual" sexual assault. 3
What if Allen is correct that there is an erosion of privacy-related tastes and expectations? Focusing on the implications for
feminism and women's well being, a decreased expectation of
and taste for privacy may be a good development, at least as it
relates to "bad" or debilitating kinds of privacy. It is good, for
example, that women have less taste for "privacy" with respect
to keeping silent about domestic violence, sexual abuse, child
abuse, and incest.' Although critics charge feminists with making everything private a matter of public concern, it is proper to
repudiate a conception of privacy that allowed courts routinely
to immunize abusive husbands from liability in the name of protecting family life (and men's prerogatives) against exposure to
the public gaze. As discussed in Section One, it is good that violence in the home is no longer regarded as just a private matter,
and that citizens do not have reasonable expectations that acts
of abuse within the home will be protected behind the shield of
privacy. 65 This is exactly the type of bad privacy that Allen and

and Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1997, at A22; James Gleick, Big Brother Is Us,
N.Y. TINES, Sept. 29, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 132. For a detailed discussion of the
threat that cyberspace poses to privacy, see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law
and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Kang,
supra note 134, at 1220-46.
162. See Jonathan I. Edelstein, Note, Anonymity and InternationalLaw Enforcement
in Cyberspace, 7 FORDHAMI INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231, 248-50 & n.90 (1996)
(discussing the use of Internet anonymity to transmit racist speech).
163. See, e.g., Carol J. Adams, "This Is Not Our Fathers' Pornography': Sex, Lies,
and Computers, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 160, at 147, 162-66 (arguing that the possibility of anonymity in cyberspace brings a lack of accountability
that intensifies women's experience of objectification).
164. See, e.g., Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labeling, and Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1271, 1306 (1994) (noting that women
who have been raped believe they need to 'tell their stories").
165. For discussion, see supra Sections IA and I.B.

790

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:759

feminist critics of privacy rightly reject. Legal reformers similarly identify such matters as public concerns and encumbrances to
citizenship.'
In contrast to secrecy and silence, we have the metaphor of
women (and other victims of abuse) finding their voices and
breaking their silence about such crimes.'6 7 In the self-exposure
manifest in the plethora of talk shows, public confessions, and
various recovery movements, including their cyberspace variants, there is a variation upon the feminist theme that the personal is political. As with women "coming out" with stories about
illegal abortions and unwanted pregnancies, the private is made
public so that victims do not suffer in silence, so that public consciousness about intimate injuries grows, and so that, hopefully,
cultural consensus shifts, prompting legal reform. 68 Perhaps one
prominent reason for women's use of narrative and feminist emphasis upon "storytelling" is the conviction that it will address
ignorance and incomprehension of women's injuries and lead to
remedies.' 6 9 As some critics point out, these types of self-disclosures and confessions can lead to a therapeutic model that substitutes for meaningful social and systemic change. 70 Yet such
disclosures and waivers of privacy might also be viewed as parts
of attempts to recreate the home as a place in which women can
be private, intimate, and safe.
A decreased taste for bad kinds of privacy is also illustrated
by the rejection of the "closet" by gay men and lesbians and
their courageous entry into the cultural debate over same-sex
relationships and sexuality. 17 ' Here, disclosure of self and of

166. See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text; see also Nancy E. Murphy,
Note, Queer Justice: Equal Protection for Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 30
VAL. U. L. REV. 335, 369-70 (1995).
167. See Stefan, supra note 164, at 1306.
168. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of
Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1515, 1539 (1998) (noting that
feminists' legal reform in the last 20 years has transformed domestic violence from a
private matter to a public concern).
169. See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 207-15 (1997).
170. See WENDY KAMINER, A FEARFUL FREEDOM: WOMEN'S FLIGHT FROM EQUALITY
192 (1990); WENDY KAMINER, I'M DYSFUNCTIONAL, YOURE DYSFUNCTIONAL: THE RECOVERY MOVEMENT AND OTHER SELF-HELP FASHIONS 70 (1992).
171. See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, Lesbian and Gay Families and the Law: A Progress Report, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 927, 948 (1994) (noting the difficulties same-sex
couples face, but nevertheless encouraging such couples to "come out").
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one's sexuality serves to shift society's understanding of what it
means to be a gay man or a lesbian, to inform the moral debate
over affording protection to same-sex marriage, and to transform
the culture as well.17 2 Women and men who have been harmed
by being forced to be silent about their sexuality and who have
had to keep their lives private, and yet could have no reasonable
expectation of privacy about their intimate life, may welcome a
decreased expectation that they will keep silent, as well as an
increased freedom to engage in more self-disclosure (in contrast,
for example, to the "world of fear and deceit" created by the military's "Don't ask, Don't tell" policy 7 3 ). The simultaneous coming
out of the television sitcom character Ellen and the actress portraying her became an occasion for other acts of coming out.174
And when rock singer Melissa Etheridge invited the cameras of
People magazine into the kitchen of the home she shares with
her female companion,17 5 she offered up her privacy for public
view and consumption, but in doing so, she facilitated more positive public attitudes about same-sex relationships.
As discussed in Section One, recent scholarship on the import
of Reconstruction suggests that part of citizenship is the right to
participate in culture and the right to use society's cultural resources to make meaning.'7 6 Perhaps this scholarship would recommend not moralizing against Jenni and Sara, but facilitating
MelissaCam or Adam and SteveCam, if you will, so that more
voices or conceptions of the good will be available for view and
critical evaluation. 77 At the same time, Allen rightly points out,

172. See Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism, Culture and the Gay Civil Rights Debate in
a Post-Civil Rights Era, 110 HARV. L. REV. 684, 687-717 (1997) (book review) (observing that a theme in recent gay and lesbian work is the vital role of cultural
transformation and the importance of reflecting gay and lesbian difference and diversity).
173. Jennifer Egan, Uniforms in the Closet, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
174. In particular, there were "Come out with Ellen" parties. See The Week That
Was, J. RECORD (Okla. City), Apr. 27, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11960908; see
also Leah Rosch, A Change of Heart, AM. HEALTH FOR WOMEN, June 1, 1997, at 66,
available in 1997 WL 10067070 (suggesting that pop culture may be influencing
women's decisions to come out).
175. Peter Castro & John Griffiths, A House in Harmony: Singer Melissa Etheridge
Hits Just the Right Note with Partner Julie Cypher, PEOPLE, Sept. 5, 1994, at 57.
176. See supra note 42-57 and accompanying text.
177. Thanks to Katherine Franke for this observation. My reference to Adam and
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using Madonna as an example, that today the personal may be
less political than profitable, implicating a vexing debate over
commodification that I will not take up here.'7 8
The ability to retain certain core values of privacy-such as
restricted access and anonymity-while simultaneously engaging
in some degree of self-disclosure may be especially valuable in
women's exploration of sexuality. Feminist theorist Carlin Meyer
provocatively argues for "Cybersexual Possibilities."7 9 She suggests that the very anonymity of cyberspace may afford persons
exploring their sexuality, particularly women, a relatively safe
space to experiment with identity, desire, and relationship.8 0
Dare we say that some women may welcome this as a good kind
of privacy, in contrast to the silence about sexuality associated
with norms of female modesty and propriety and the suppression of honest talk about sexuality? Meyer, who champions the
importance of "free-wheeling" sex talk,'' argues not that pornography as presently constituted is liberatory or liberating, but
that women can engage in a cultural battle for reconstituting
and reconstructing sexuality along less misogynist, racist, and
homophobic lines. 8"

Steve comes from a slogan I once saw on a placard opposing gay rights: "God created Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve."
178. See Allen, supra note 1, at 737. The impact on not only women's own privacy
and private choice but also that of other women must be considered because of the
social meaning of being a woman as being sexually available to men. On
commodification, see MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED CoMMODITIES (1996).
179. Meyer, supra note 12, at 1969.
180. See ac at 1994-2008; see also Lee Tien, Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech?;
McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REv. 117, 173-75 & n.285 (1996) (discussing
importance of anonymity to women's identity). For example, some women have written about the pleasure that they experienced through role playing in "chat rooms" in
which they took on alter egos or dramatic personae. The stage names or assumed
names gave them a security that they might not have felt in "real life." See id at
170-73, 182-84.
181. See Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1154 (1994). For a discussion of the importance of "freewheeling" sex talk to women's liberation, see id. at 1146-57.
182. See Meyer, supra note 12, at 1976. I recognize that there is vigorous feminist
debate over pornography and whether it has liberatory potential; some feminists argue that pornography has such a silencing effect that the "more speech" remedy is
ineffective. Compare Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and
Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 36 (1985), with Meyer, supra note 181, at
1146-57.
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If, through exploring such cybersexual possibilities, women
might participate in the cultural construction of sexuality and
educate and inform themselves and others about female desire
(and the lack thereof), fantasies, fears, and the like, this seems
to be an important step toward a society in which misogynistic
and merely male-centered views of sexuality hold less sway.18
Like Meyer, I do not mean to ignore that problems of male domination and sex inequality in "real life" also carry over into "virtual reality."'8 4 So too, while there is some encouraging evidence
that women are "fast closing the Web gender gap, " ' 5 for
cyberspace to realize its potential to foster more equality and
agency, much remains to be done to expand access and inclusion
across barriers of sex, race, and class.'8 6 Nonetheless, Meyer's
feminist argument that cyberspace could offer a place for sexual
reconstruction "in the safety of anonymity and privacy" suggests
the continuing appeal of good kinds of privacy-that is, privacy
that allows persons to form and revise their identities and to
form associations. 87 Indeed, the ability to enter into (and exit)
many different types of conversations and encounters in cyberspace, and to experiment with identity and act with varying
degrees of self-disclosure, may facilitate new forms of self-consti-

183. See Gina Kolata, Women and Sex: On This Topic, Science Blushes, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 21, 1998, § 15, at 3 (reporting an absence of research concerning female
sexual desire (and lack thereof) and Dr. Julia Heiman's comments that, for society
to sanction research on sexual dysfunction in women, p]eople would have to view
women's sexual desire as an important issue").
184. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 163, at 147-62 (noting the presence of the "real
life" problems of male domination and exploitation of women in cyberspace). There
are also, undeniably, some shocking stories of violence that follow when persons who
meet on the Internet meet and date in real life. See, e.g., Man Convicted of Assaulting Woman He Met on Internet, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Apr. 16, 1998, at 8A, available in 1998 WL 2528572.
185. Nina Teicholz, Women Want It All, and It's All on Line, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
1998, at G10.
186. For a helpful discussion, see CYBERSPACE DIVIDE: EQUALITY, AGENCY AND POLICY
IN THE INFORMATION SOcIETY 35-56 (Brian D. Loader ed., 1998); Meyer, supra note

12, at 2007 (arguing against censorship of sexually explicit material on the Internet
and in favor of expanding Internet access to women and across class boundaries).
187. See Meyer, supra note 12, at 2008. In contrast to walking down a city street
(certainly my experience in New York City), it is unusual that a person "traveling"
in cyberspace accidentally or unwillingly encounters explicit sexual material. If a
"conversation" one is either participating in or following becomes offensive, one can,
so to speak, leave the room.
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tution and self-revision, and may lead to greater fluidity in
thinking about the meaning and boundaries of gender and sexual identity. 8 '
CONCLUSION

Reconstructing privacy is a worthwhile task. I concur in Professor Allen's steadfast insistence that privacy is salvageable
and eminently worthy of feminist embrace. In this Essay, I suggest the contours of three reconstructive projects vital to an adequate liberal feminist conception of privacy. If,as Allen concludes, "[w]e are very much at the beginning, not the end, of a
fresh line of thinking about privacy, culture, and regulative
norms,"'8 9 attending to those reconstructive projects is important. There will likely be an ongoing debate over the relationship of privacy to citizenship and whether and how government
might, as Allen prescribes, shore up privacy norms as part of a
formative project, as the new information technologies make
new forms of self-exposure possible. I have raised some questions about the justification for and the contours of such a project. In pursuing these issues further, it is important not to ask
too much of privacy, because one value alone cannot provide us
with a complete account of the good life or the preconditions for
free and equal citizenship.

188. To be sure, acts of self-exposure that take place within a patriarchal culture
assigning them meaning may be read as having a meaning quite different from the
meaning intended by the person doing the exposing.
189. Allen, supra note 1, at 757.

